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SELF-CONTAINED SELF·RESCUER FIELD EVALUATION: 
FOURTH-PHASE RESULTS 
By Nicholas Kyriazi1 and John P. Shubllla2 
ABSTRACT 
A joint effort by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) and the u.s. Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) was undertaken to determine how well self-contained self-rescuers (SCSR's), 
deployed in accordance with Federal regulations (30 CPR 75.1714), held up in the underground 
environment with regard to both physical damage and aging. This report presents findings regarding 
laboratory-tested SCSR's in the fourth phase of testing from 1989 to 1993. The SCSR's were tested on 
human subjects and on a breathing and metabolic simulator (BMS). These results indicate that most 
of the apparatus, if they pass their inspection criteria, perform as expected except units with manu-
facturing defects. However, when the apparatus are carried in and out of the mine daily and stored at 
the working section, they may suffer abuse. Physical signs of abuse, unless extremely obvious, are 
frequently not detected by the miners or mine operators. In addition, some apparatus collected for this 
study had not been returned to the manufacturer in a recall effort for correction of a manufacturing 
defect. In both cases, the apparatus would have presented problems in emergency use. Recom-
mendations include improved training in inspection procedures and better enforcement of recall notices. 
lBiomedicai engineer. 
2Engineering technician. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 21, 1981, coal mine operators in the United 
States were required to make available to each under-
ground coal miner a self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR). 
The regulations (30 CFR 75.1714) require that each 
person in an underground coal mine wear, carry, or have 
immediate access to a device that provides respiratory 
protection with an O2 source for at least 1 h, as rated by 
the certifying agencies, the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and MSHA. The 
USBM is involved with MSHA in a long-term, in-mine 
evaluation of SCSR's now deployed in underground coal 
mines. In this study, MSHA's responsibility is to identify 
the participating mines and to procure from those mines 
the SCSR's to be tested. The USBM replaces those 
SCSR's with new apparatus and tests the SCSR's in its 
laboratories. The objective of this long-term program is 
to· evaluate the in-mine, operational durability of SCSR's. 
Of utmost concern is the successful performance of any 
SCSR that passes its manufacturer's inspection criteria. 
The USBM is interested only in apparatus that pass their 
inspection criteria. Such apparatus are relied upon to 
function successfully in an emergency. Apparatus that fail 
inspection criteria are expected to be removed from 
service. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
This program involves testing approximately 100 SCSR's 
in each phase of the study. This report describes findings 
in the fourth phase of testing occurring from late 1989 
through early 1993. Testing was conducted using a BMS 
and human subjects on a treadmill. 
The SCSR's tested were manufactured by CSE Corp., 
Draegerwerk AG, Mine Safety Appliances Co., Inc. 
(MSA), and Ocenco, Inc. and were sampled according to 
estimated market share (table 1). The sampling was mod-
ified to ensure that at least 10 SCSR's from each manu-
facturer were sampled for each phase of the program, 
90 pct using the BMS and 10 pct with human subjects. 
Table 1.-Self-contalned self-rescuers received for evaluation 
Apparatus 
CSE AU-9A1 .....••.••......•••. 
Draeger OXY-SR 60B ••........... 
MSA 60-mln SCSR •............•. 
















Some apparatus were not tested because of failure to 
pass inspection criteria or becausc· of a manufacturing 
defect preventing testing. 
The 02 constant-flow rate is checked on compressed-02 
apparatus; the NIOSH-required flowis 1.5 L/min at ambi-
ent temperature and pressure, dry (ATPD). 
All apparatus are checked for leak-tightness after open-
ing. The leak test used is that recommended for the CSE 
AU-9A1 by the manufacturer; this test is identical to the 
one required by Draeger for the BG-174 rescue breathing 
apparatus. The test is performed to determine the leak-
tightness of the breathing circuit; i.e., how well the ap-
paratus isolates the user from the assumed-toxic envi-
ronment. Passing the test is not a requirement of the 
regulations. The test was required by CSE to be per-
formed by the user after field refurbishment of the 
AU-9A1; however, field service is no longer authorized. 
MSHA selected the participating mines with regard to 
type of mining operation, coalbed height, and SCSR de-
ployment mode to obtain a representative cross section of 
U.S. mines. 
The BMS test consisted of the average metabolic work 
rate exhibited by the 50th-percentile miner weighing 87 kg 
while performing the 1-h man test 4 from 30 CFR 11. 
The metabolic workload (volumes at standard pressure 
and temperature, dry (STPD» is given in table 2. In 
the treadmill testing, the subjects walked at whatever 
spced and grade resulted in an O2 consumption rate of 
1.35 L/min (STPD). The other parameters of the 
"t 
workload cannot be controlled in human test subjects, but 
are listed in table 3, all volumes at STPD. 
Table 2.-BMS metabolic workload 
0z consumption rate •...•.......•.....•. L/mln.. 1.35 
CO2 production rate . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . .. L/mln.. 1.10 
Ventilation rate . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . •. L/min.. 30.0 
Tidal volume .•....•••.••......••. L per breath • • 1.68 
Respiratory frequency .•••.•.•.... breaths per min. . 17.9 
Peak respiratory flow rate: 
Inhalation .•.••.•••...•.•..........• L/mln.. 89 
Exhalation ...•••..........•.....•.•. L/min.. 71 
Table 3.-Human sUbject workloads In treadmill teats 
Subject 
A ............ . 
B ........... .. 




RF Respiratory frequency. 
VCOz CO2 production rate. 










The parameters monitored were inhaled levels of CO2 
and Oz, inhalation wet- and dry-bulb temperatures, and 
inhalation and exhalation breathing pressures in both the 
BMS and treadmill testing. In the BMS testing, however, 
average inhaled levels of gas concentration were measured 
as opposed to minimum values of COz and maximum 
values of Oz in the treadmill testing. Average inhaled gas 
levels include the effect of apparatus dead space, whereas 
minimum values of CO2• for example, are only the lowest 
level of gas concentration during inhalation. The BMS 
measures average inhaled values by electronically summing 
all the COz and Oz of each inhalation cycle, weighted by 
the instantaneous flow rate. The BMS also measures min-
imum inhaled COz levels. End-of-breath, dry- and wet-
bulb temperatures, and peak inhalation and exhalation 
breathing pressures were measured. 
Tests on the BMS were terminated upon exhaustion of 
the Oz supply as indicated by large negative pressures 
coinciding with an empty breathing bag. Treadmill tests 
were terminated in the same manner or if inhaled mini-
mum CO2 levels reached 4 pet, maximum O2 levels fell 
below 15 pct, at which points negative physiological symp-
toms begin to occur, or if the test subject stopped because 
of subjectively high breathing pressures or temperatures. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Experience with each brand of apparatus is discussed 
separately. The values of the monitored parameters were 
averaged over the entire test duration and are presented 
graphically (figs. 1-4) for each apparatus by parameter. 
The values for deployed units tested on the BMS can be 
compared with the values for new units tested on the 
BMS, and to some extent, with deployed units tested on 
human subjects on a treadmill, which are plotted after-
ward. Because human s~bjects lpay diffpr from each other 
and from the BMS in terms of VCOz, Ve, and respiratory 
frequency, all of which will affect apparatus duration as 
well as all of the monitored parameters, these tests cannot 
be considered necessarily equivalent to the BMS tests even 
though the O2 consumption rate is the same. Missing data 
points are indicative of equipment malfunction or other 
anomaly that invalidated the data. 
The Wilcoxon rank·sum test was performed for each 
monitored parameter to determine whether or not the 
deployed units behaved differently from new units. It tests 
the hypothesis that the two samples are from populations 
with the same mean. The values from both samples are 
ranked in ascending order of magnitude. If the sum of the 
ranks of the smaller sample (T) (in this case, new units) 
falls within the acceptable range for the given sample sizes, 
then there is not sufficient evidence at the specified 
probability level (P=0.05, two-sided) to say that the means 
of the two samples differ. The rank-sum test does not rely 
upon the assumptions that either the new- or deployed-
unit data are normal distributions or that they have iden-
tical variances, as does the t-test for two populations of 
independent samples. One limitation of the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test is that it does not distinguish between large 
and small differences in values. The results of the two-
sided, P=0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are presented in 
table 4. The probability of T, the rank sum of the new 
units, falling outside the given range is 0.05 if the popu-
lations have the same mean. 
Table 4.-Wllcoxon rank-sum test results 
Duration Av Av Wet-bulb Dry-bulb Inhalation Exhalation 
Apparatus Range T inhaled CO2 inhaled 0z temp temp pressure pressure 
Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T 
CSE .•...• 22-66 40 22-66 43 13-50 46 13-50 53 13-50 52 20-60 44 20-60 42 
Draeger ... 16-68 43 16-68 66 16-68 34 15-63 43 16-68 23 16-68 43 16-68 39 
MSA ..••.• 16-44 34 16-44 26 16-44 34 15-41 45 16-44 41 16-44 19 16-44 41 
Ocenco ... 15-60 22 14-58 32 15-60 40 14-58 16 14-58 34 14-58 37 14-58 36 
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eSE 
Five of the twenty apparatus sampled were found to 
have their original, unmodified O2 regulators. Because the 
original regulators have the potential to burst apart with 
great force upon opening of the cylinder valve, making the 
unit unusable and possibly injuring the user or persons 
nearby, the apparatus were recalled in 1986 to have their 
regulators modified. The regulator of one unit did burst 
upon opening prior to starting a BMS test. Normally, the 
damaged regulator would be replaced with a new one and 
then the unit tested. This was not done, however, since 
other components were damaged by the burst. The cyl-
inder on the unit had been opened once before to check 
its constant flow rate with no problem, illustrating the 
random nature of the occurrence. The problem of end-
users not complying with the manufacturer's request for 
recall was reported to MSHA. 
The modified regulators of two other units malfunc-
tioned without bursting, but vented large quantities of 
stored O2 before being turned off. They functioned prop-
erly after reopening and were tested without further inci-
dent. Other than being frightening, the only negative 
impact is a loss of stored O2 and consequently, some 
apparatus duration. 
Eight of the apparatus failed the leak-tightness test. 
One apparatus had an empty O2 cylinder. This unit was 
refilled and tested. Several units had loose or discon-
nected CO2 canisters and O2 cylinder straps. One unit had 
its relief valve disconnected from the breathing bag. The 
red seal was broken on the O2 cylinder of one unit indicat-
ing that the valve had been opened and closed, although 
still registering full. The belt strap of one unit was caught 
in the case seal. All these occurrences imply that the 
units were either not refurbished properly or deVeloped 
the problems over the time that they were deployed 
underground. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the wet- and dry-bulb 
temperatures showed higher values for new than deployed 
units. As can be seen from figure 1, however, the new-
unit values are only slightly higher than the deployed 
values; if deployment causes the apparatus to run cooler, 
that is no cause for alarm. It has been found that the 
temperature of the laboratory and the use of the exhaust 
fan significantly affect the inhalation temperature of the 
apparatus being tested. The higher new-unit temperatures 
may be attributed to coincidentally high laboratory tem-
peratures. Real or coincidental, the finding is of little 
concern for this study. 
The higher breathing pressures in the human subject 
versus the BMS testing are directly related to higher ven-
tilation rates by the human test subjects, possibly due to 
human reaction to super-ambient, average inhaled CO2 
levels. The BMS does not react to high CO2 by increasing 
ventilation. 
Six deployed units tested on the BMS and one unit 
tested on a human subject reached 4 pet CO2 (break-
th,rough) before the O2 supply was expended. The BMS 
tests were permitted to continue until the O2 supply was 
expended while the treadmill test was terminated at that 
time. One new unit tested on the BMS also experienced 
CO2 breakthrough. Table 5 illustrates the situation. 
Table 5.-CSE CO2 breakthrough times, minutes 
Type of unit and test' CO2 Final 
method breakthrough termination 
BMS: 






New ....•..... 75 81 
Human on treadmill: 
Deployed. . . • . . . 86 86 
BMS Breathing and metabolic simulator. 
The second treadmill-tested unit was removed at 81 min 
after the subject complained of high breathing pressures, 
which reached +150 and -150 mm HzO. The minimum 
inhaled CO2 level at that time was 3.4 pet. Human reac-
tion to high CO2 is to increase ventilation rate. This 
results in higher breathing pressures that eventually limit 
ventilation rate, and, fmally, O2 consumption rate, which 
limits work rate. 
DRAEGER 
One unit, SN 282, in BMS testing, exhibited high av-
erage inhaled CO2 levels with low levels of minimum 
inhaled CO2, A large spread between average and min-
imum inhaled CO2 is usually indicative of large dead 
space-breathing circuit volume containing exhaled air, 
uncleansed of CO2, which will be rebreathed. Since this 
unit had a much higher spread than other units of this 
same model-a difference between average and minimum 
inhaled CO2 of approximately 2.0 pet versus the usual 
0.6 pct-the unit was inspected after testing. It was found 
that the exhalation check valve was stiff and brittle, pre-
venting it from shutting during inhalation, thus, increasing 
the volume of dead space. This appears to be caused by 
aging of the check valve material, natural rubber. The in-
halation check valves, made of silicon, were in good con-
dition. A review of past test data revealed that another 
unit (SN 585) experienced this same wide spread between 




, .. , 
disposed of before it could be inspected to confIrm a 
brittle check valve. 
This condition would affect a wearer increasingly as 
work rate and breath volume decrease making the dead 
space a larger fraction of breath volume. As this hap-
pened, average inhaled CO2 would increase, causing most 
users to increase their breath volume in an attempt to 
dilute the CO2, Some users are not as sensitive to CO2 
and would not increase their breath volume; they would 
experience higher CO2 levels. This problem was reported 
to NIOSH and MSHA. Draeger was already replacing 
this check valve as part of a recall replacing the breathing 
hose so no further action was necessary. The breathing 
hose has been found in recent years to be taking a set in 
its folded position making it increasingly diffIcult to open 
for use. 
Six of 25 units failed the leak-tightness test. One unit 
had a broken nose-clip clamp; it had not been sent back 
to the manufacturer in the recall program of 1985 for 
replacement of the clamps. 
Two deployed units tested on the BMS and one unit 
tested on a human subject reached 4 pct CO2 before the 
O2 supply was expended. One of the two deployed BMS 
units, however, was tested in two sessions separated by 
40 days, due to equipment problems. This delay may have 
resulted in degradation of the bed. One new unit tested 
on the BMS also experienced CO2 breakthrough (see ta-
ble 6). 
Table 6.-Draeger CO2 breakthrough times, 
minute. 
Type of unit and test CO2 Final 
method breakthrough termination 
BMS: 
Deployed . . . . . . . 55 65 
61 70 
New.......... 54 72 
Human on treadmill: 
Deployed • . • • . . . 69 69 
BMS Breathing and metabolic simulator. 
MSA 
All the apparatus tested were carried by MSHA mine 
inspectors. Two of the 12 units sampled had dislocated 
shock mounts, presumably due to severe impact. These 
two were built in 1980 and were part of a group of appara-
tus sold to MSHA before the apparatus was produced 
commercially. The commercially available apparatus built 
later incorporated design changes intended to remedy this 
tendency. Two of the apparatus failed the leak test. 
9 
One of the apparatus with the dislocated shock mounts 
also experienced a sodium chlorate candle misfIre. When 
it was started manually with multiple exhalations, a fme, 
white mist was visible coming back out through the 
mouthpiece. It is presumed that the mist was K02 since 
breathing it was extremely irritating. The unit was then 
run on the BMS without incident. A user would have 
needed to further wet down the breathing circuit with 
more breaths before it could have been worn. Since the 
defective fIlter that likely caused this incident is not found 
in commercially available units, and since MSHA has no 
more of this type of apparatus, no action was taken. 
Wet-bulb temperatures for new units were significantly 
higher than deployed units, but dry-bulb temperatures 
were in line with each other (fig. 3). This means that the 
humidity was higher in the new units than the deployed 
units. The reason for this is unknown. A review of the 
data revealed no relation between the wet-bulb tempera-
ture and test date or serial number. There may be some 
physical cause for this phenomenon related to the KOz 
bed condition, but no similar phenomenon was observed 
in previous phases of this study. In any case, decreased 
humidity in the breathing air is no great impediment to 
escape. 
Figure 3 shows also that the wet-bulb temperatures 
in the treadmill tests were slightly lower than in the BMS 
tests. The dry-bulb temperatures, however, were much 
lower, a phenomenon also seen in the Draeger tests 
(fig. 2). Both of these are chemical-Oz units. In the 
compressed-02 units, the wet- and dry-bulb temperatures 
are similar for the treadmill and BMS tests. The reason 
for the difference is, at present, unknown; the BMS closely 
matches wet- and dry-bulb exhalation temperatures of 
human subjects breathing similar wet- and dry-bulb gas 
mixtures. This will be further explored by the USBM. 
Five deployed units tested on the BMS reached 4 pct 
COz before the O2 supply was expended. Three new units 
tested on the BMS also experienced CO2 breakthrough 
(see table 7). 
Table 7.-MSA CO2 breakthrough times, minute. 
Type of unit and test COz Final 
method breakthrough termination 
BMS: 




















One apparatus, SN 63886, had a low O2 constant-flow 
rate (0.67 L/min ATPD instead of the NIOSH-required 
1.5 L/min ATPD), and in the BMS test, exhibited low O2 
levels. After testing, closer inspection of the unit revealed 
a cracked demand valve regulator housing. This permitted 
some of the gas flow to leak out of the circuit to ambient, 
and since the O2 supply rate was now lower than the con-
sumption rate, the demand valve was activated. However, 
instead of drawing gas from the O2 cylinder, ambient air 
was drawn into the circuit through the cracks, thus, 
lowering the Ozlevel. In emergency use, the in-leakage of 
ambient air would have negatively affected the user. Even 
if the ambient air were not toxic or hypoxic, the in-leakage 
would have made the air in the breathing circuit go 
hypoxic, the extent depending upon the in-leakage rate of 
79 pct N2, ambient air. It is presumed that the demand 
valve regulator housing was damaged from impact to the 
outer case. The gas supply hose from the cylinder attaches 
to the housing in such a manner that it acts as a lever arm, 
extending outwards and nearly touching the inside of the 
case. It can crack the housing at its point of attachment 
if it is deflected by an impact of the case. This problem 
has been reported to NIOSH and MSHA. 
None of the deployed apparatus passed the leak test, 
although new apparatus don't pass, either. In a short ex-
periment, five of six units checked did pass this noncerti-
fication test when their relief valves were capped, implying 
backflow through the valves. The average leak rate ex-
hibited by the apparatus at a moderate work rate is not 
believed to present a danger to the user, however. 
Four units were found to have damage that was suf-
ficient to require them to be removed from service. One 
had a crack in the clear, polycarbonate casej a second had 
its orange, U-channel, case seal pinched, a piece of loose 
orange rubber in the case, and a dented canister; a third 
had its U -channel case seal blown out of the case bottom; 
and the fourth had a small crack in its case and a visible, 
rusty canister rim. After opening, this unit was found to . 
also have a dented canister and a broken cylinder neck 
clamp. All the units were able to be tested, however, and 
performed normally. 
The high inhalation pressures exhibited by some of the 
apparatus on the BMS (fig. 4) were caused by activation 
of the demand valve, which is relatively stiff. When the 
demand valve is not required, the inhalation pressures are 
low, reflecting low system resistance. 
Two deployed units tested on the BMS and one on a 
human subject reached 4 pct CO2 before or at the time the 
O2 supply was expended (see table 8). 
Table 8.-Ocenco CO2 breakthrough 
times, minutes 
Type of unit and test CO2 Final 
method breakthrough termination 
BMS: 
Deployed . . • . . . . 93 99 
96 100 
Human on treadmill: 
Deployed . . . . . . • 92 92 
BMS Breathing and metabolic simulator. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study suggest that the large majority 
of SCSR's that pass their inspection criteria can be relied 
upon to provide a safe level of life support cal>ability for 
mine escape purposes. Few problems have arisen involv-
ing subtle performance degradation due to the mining 
environment: the cracked demand valve-regulator housing 
on the Ocenco EBA 6.5 and possible loosening of internal 
component connections on the CSE AU-9A1. Some 
minor problems with materials have been noted due to 
age: the exhalation check valve and the breathing hose on 
the Draeger OXY-SR 60B. 
Some SCSR's collected during the study were damaged 
by daily, in-mine use and should have been removed from 
service. The damage was generally apparent and visible 
and should have been detected if the SCSR's had been 
properly inspected. Improved training is recommended. 
Problems were found with users not responding to man-
ufacturer recalls. This may result in apparatus not func-
tioning properly in an emergency as in the case of the 
bursting regulators on the CSE AU-9A1. Improved 
enforcement of manufacturer recalls is recommended. 
The results of this continuing program provided the 
groundwork and justification for the recently implemented 
service life plans for SCSR's deployed in underground coal 
mines. These plans will improve the reliability of SCSR's. 
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